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The analytic goal of this study is to determine the 
impact of partisan~hip, ideology, and constituency charac-
teristiqs on Representatives' and Senators' support for 
envirdnment~l legislation in the 97th Congress. The degree 
to which a member supports such legislation is determined by 
scores developed by the League of Conservation Voters. 
These scores represent the percentage of time the member 
voted in accordance with the League's position on selected 
environmental votes. The findings of this study suggest 
that partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteris-
tics do affect congressional pro-environmental voting 
behavior. 
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assisted me in the development and completion of this work. 
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England, for his inva1uable comments, suggestions, and 
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for the methodological comments from Dr. Barrie Blunt. 
Overall, the support provided .bY the members of this 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL NEXUS: 
PROBLEMS, ACTORS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times'' 
is a description that is equally appropriate for literary 
and actual realities. The present "times" illustrates this 
duality of condition when one examines the complexity of the 
economic and environmental nexus. Society is constantly 
using and demanding more resources while at the same time 
becoming more aware of the costs of such consumption. As a 
result, 
the prognosis is that the economy, left to its 
present course, will produce more and more con-
sumer goods, but will offer them to a society in 
which filth, noise, and other forms of pollution 
grow and in which public services continue to 
deteriorate (Baumel and Oates, 1979: 2). 
Environmental degredation is largely the result of the 
common ownership of many natural resources. No one specifi-
cally owns resources such as the air 9r water and as a 
result, there may be no incentive to protect or preserve 
them. Consequently, producers are free to use these 
resources and escape the resulting social costs of such use 
(Hardin, 1968; Baumel and Oates, 1979). The following 
example illustrates this problem. 
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If a community of 5,000 people owns a property, 
say a lake, in common, and one of those 5,000, the 
owner of a sawmill on the lake, creates $100,000 
worth of water-pollution damage to the lake, he or 
she suffers only $20 or 1/5,000 of that damage; 
the rest of the cost of the damage is spread among 
the other members of the community. Furthermore, 
even if the sawmill owner were to be moved by 
conscience from polluting the lake, competition 
may allow no choice in the matter. So long as 
some unprincipled business rival is prepared to 
take advantage of the opportunity to save in 
abatement costs by letting (most of) the damage to 
the common property be borne by others, our 
original sawmill owner cannot afford to bear the 
entire cost alone. Competition can force the hand 
of even the best-intentioned decision maker 
(Baumol and Oates, 1979: 113). 
Methods of protecting these common properties, while 
maintaining economic growth, generates factions of opinion. 
Many industrialists, chambers of commerce, and economists 
believe that growth is equated with progress and that 
maximum production and consumption are a sign of a healthy 
economy (Beckerman, 1974; Feinberg, 1977; Maddox, 1972; 
Wilson, 1977). This growth, they indicate, will produce a 
high standard of living, low unemployment and inflation, and 
provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of environ-
mental quality. Critics of this viewpoint--environmenta-
lists, some economists and industrialists--argue that this 
growth is neither desirable or possible (Barkley and 
Seckler, 1972; Commoner, 1971; Ophuls, 1977). They are 
concerned with the finite nature of our resources, and the 
environmental costs of maximum consumption and production. 
The American public also maintains conflicting perspec-
tives on the economic-environmental dilemma. Surveys which 
are designed to determine citizen's views toward growth, 
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energy development, and environmental protection find no 
clear consensual preference among citizens (see Table I). 
It is possible that this consensus does not emerge because 
"the public want[s] both of these facets of a bountiful 
life--a healthy and growing economy, and a healthful and 
safe environment" (Ladd, 1982: 19). 
The dilemmas posed by these issues will undoubtealy 
manifest themselves in the political system. To influence 
this system and its policy decisions, interest groups and 
citizens may concentrate their efforts on any or all 
branches and levels of government. Serving as receptors for 
these demands and preferences, the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches must make policy choices which may 
involve tradeoffs in the economic-environmental arena. The 
bureaucracy is then responsible for developing specific 
regulations and guidelines to implement the broad policy 
decisions of the other branches. The results are economic-
environmental policies which may then generate further 
interest group and citizen demands and preferences. This 
system is summarized in model form in Figure 1. 
The present study examines one facet in the economic-
environmental policy process--the legislative branch. 
Within this branch, policy preferences and decisions are 
expressed through voting decisions. An examination, there-
fore, of factors affecting these decisions may enhance our 
ability to understand and predict individual and congres-
sional policy outputs. Specifically, this study considers 
3 
"Protecting the 
environment is so 
important that re-
quirements and stan-
dards cannot be too 
high, and continuing 
environmental im-
provements must be 




13% No opinion 
TABLE I 
PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL NEXUS 
Questions and Responses 
"At the present time, 
do you think environ-
mental protection 
laws and regulations 
have gone too far, or 
not far enough, or 
have struck about the 
right balance?"b 
21% Gone too far 
38% Struck about the 
right balance 
31% Not far enough 
10% Don't know/no 
answer 
"Some important regu-
lations aimed at pro-
tecting the environ-
ment should be dropped 




acBS News/New York Times, September 22-27, 1981. 
bRoper Organization, September 19-26, 1981. 
cABC News/Washington Post, February 19-10, 1981. 
Source: Public Opinion, 1982. 
"Are you more on the 
side of adequate 
energy or more on 
the side of protec-
ting the environ-
ment?"b 
40% Protecting the 
environment 
39% Adequate energy 
13% Neither/no 
conflict 






















Bureaucracy ~ Environmental 
Policy 
Figure 1. A Heuristic Model of the Economic-Environmental Policy Process 
Vl 
pro-environmental voting among U.S. Representatives and 
Senators in the 97th Congress. 
Previous studies (see Chapter II) have examined the 
effects of partisanship, ideology, and constituency charac-
teristics on congressional and environmental voting 
decisions. This inquiry extends these past examinations in 
two ways. First, earlier studies have not considered the 
effects these factors may have on senatorial environmental 
voting. For example, Dunlap and Allen (1976: 388) justify 
their exclusion of the Senate by stating: 
Since it is impossible to provide meaningful 
constituency measures for senators--due to the 
size and heterogeneity of entire states--we will 
confine our analysis to the members of the House, 
who represent smaller and more homogeneous dis-
tricts. 
Although it may be difficult to obtain useful constituency 
measures for senators, indicators do exist and are employed 
in this study. 
Second, this examination considers the effects of 
partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on 
legislators during a period which is unlike those which 
previous studies have examined. The conflict between 
encouraging economic growth and maintaining environmental 
quality has become particularily pronounced in the 1980s .. 
In one effort to resolve this dilemma, the Reagan adminis-
tration has developed a set of guidelines for federal 
agencies in the calculation of benefits and costs of water 
and related land resources development projects. While 
considering environmental quality, the principles and 
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guidelines suggest that the project's contribution to 
national economic development is the prime consideration in 
an assessment of its feasibility. This economic priority 
represents a change of emphasis away from the previously 
strong committment to environmental quality considerations 
(U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983). Because of this new 
administrative priority, this study provides an examination 
of a Congress which is subject to new priorities and 
pressures from the executive branch. 
The study is organized into four remaining chapters. 
Chapter II presents an overview of this general area of 
inquiry. Based on this review of the literature, several 
hypotheses are posited with respect to variables affecting 
congressional environmental voting. Chapter III outlines 
the research design employed in the study. Chapter IV 
reports the findings resulting from the analysis. Finally, 
the findings and their implications are summarized and 
discussed in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II 
LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY: A REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
Legislators are faced with a variety of pressures and 
cues that affect their decisions. In brief, their decision 
making process is extremely complex and a plethora of 
factors may influence the outcome of the process--voting 
decisions. Previous research suggest that background 
characteristics of legislators (Asher and Weisberg, 1978), 
electoral realities (Cooper et al., 1977) and partisanship, 
ideology, and constituency characteristics (see below) may 
affect a legislator's voting choices. 
The following is an.overview of factors examined in 
this study which are associated with legislative and 
environmental voting. 
Partisanship 
The study of the influence of partisanship on congres-
sional voting is not a new consideration. Early studies 
have found that floor votes do indeed fall into patterns and 
that partisanship explains one such pattern (Lowell, 1901; 
Rice, 1928; Turner, 1951). More recently, Davidson (1969: 
147) states that party "constitutes the single most 
8 
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important group loyalty for members of Congress" and 
Schneier (1970: 239) argues that party is "the single most 
important factor in roll call voting." Other studies also 
support the existence of party line voting in Congress 
(MacRae, 1958; Truman, 1959; Mayhew, 1966; Kingdon, 1981). 
Although differences undoubtedly exist between the two 
major parties which affect congressional voting, it is 
reasonable to assume that some issues do not generate a 
variance of opinion. Because the maintenance of environ-
mental quality is a collective good in which all may 
benefit, it is reasonable to believe that this may be one 
such consensus issue. Ogden (1971: 246) states that: 
in their competition for power, both parties are 
certain to favor environmental quality, to oppose 
pollution, [and] to support conservation. 
Other scholars, however, do not agree with this observation 
(see below). 
Englebert (1961), in an historical examination of 
political parties and natural resources policies from 1790 -
1950, finds significant differences between the parties in 
this area. By reviewing party platforms he concludes that: 
of the two major parties since 1860 ... the 
Democrats, on the whole, have placed more emphasis 
on natural resources in their platforms than the 
Republicans. Not only have the Democrats devoted 
more statements to the subject, but they have 
tended to be more specific (240). 
By examining the 1980 Democratic and Republican Party 
platforms, one continues to find differences between the two 
parties. In general, Democrats believe that conservation is 
the cheapest form of energy production and they propose a 
9 
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program of energy-conservation grants. They suggest that 
federal funds should be used to develop renewable resources, 
with the goal of using solar power to meet 20 percent of 
U.S. energy needs by the year 2000. In addition, the 
Democrats would stop major oil companies from acquiring coal 
and solar energy firms (Democratic Party, 1980). 
In contrast, the Republicans emphasize energy produc-
tion over conservation and reject massive governmental 
involvement and incentive programs. They propose to repeal 
the windfall profits tax and dismantle all remaining con-
trols on oil and gas. In general, Republicans advocate less 
governmental involvement in the economic-environmental area 
than do Democrats (Republican Party, 1980). 
Clearly, from the standpoint of what the parties 
propose to do in this area, there are significant 
differences. To further test the extent of these dif-
ferences, one must move from the rhetoric of party platforms 
to the reality of congressional voting. Voting represents a 
concrete choice on substantive issues and thus serves to 
further our understanding of partisan differences. 
In addition to finding differences between party plat-
forms, Englebert (1961: 241) discovers that the Democrats 
have had a "slightly better congressional voting record on 
natural resources than the Republicans" for the period of 
1860 to 1950. His findings are presented in Table II. 
Recent examinations of congressional roll call voting 
on environmental issues supports Englebert's historical 
TABLE II 
CONGRESSIONAL VOTING RECORD OF POLITCAL PARTIES 
ON LEGISLATION FOR NATURAL RESOURCES 
FROM 1861 TO 1950* 
Years 
11 
Party and Votes 1861-1890 1891-1920 1921-1950 1861-1950** 
Democrats 
F 34.8% 45.2% 70.6% 50.2% 
UF 29.8 14.6 13.6 19. 3 
NV 35.4 40.2 15.8 30.5 
Republicans 
F 58.7% 48.7% 34.4% 47.3% 
UF 13.8 13.4 51.4 26.2 
NV 27.5 37.9 14.2 26.5 
Minor Parties 
F 48.6% 42.3% 51.8% 47.6% 
UF 20.2 26.9 38.9 28.7 
NV 31.1 30.8 9.3 23.7 
F = Vote favorable to the conservation and development of 
natural resource. 
UF = Vote unfavorable to the conservation and development of 
natural resource. 
NV = Non-voting. 
*The figures are based on outstanding natural resources 
legislation enacted after 1860 for which voting 
records were available. They are expressed in 
terms of percentages of the total vote (including 
non-voting) for each party for each period. 
**This column represents an average of the three periods. 
Source: Englebert, 1961: 242. 
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analysis. By extending Turner's (1951) analysis of voting 
patterns through 1964, Schneier (1970) finds that there are 
partisan differences on environmental issues and that the 
Democrats generally take the most environmentally favorable 
position. In his analysis of seven recent congressional 
sessions, Clausen (1973) states that roll call votes can be 
classified into a few broad dimensions and that the environ-
mental issues are classified in the "government management" 
dimension. Clausen argues that this dimension provokes the 
greatest amount of opposition between the two parties with 
the Democrats supporting government management (including 
environmental control) more so than Republicans. 
Other roll call studies, of a less comprehensive scope, 
also support the existence of partisan differences on 
environmental legislation. By examining the 1971 U.S. House 
of Representatives and an index of environmental voting com-
piled by the League of Conservation Voters, Ritt and 
Ostheimer (1974) find that Democrats ranked significantly 
higher than Republicans on the index. Dunlap and Gale 
(1974) find in the 1971 Oregon state legislature that 
Democratic legislators rank higher than Republicans in terms 
of pro-environmental voting on roll calls. Similarily, 
Dunlap and Allen (1976) and Kenski and Kenski (1980) 
conclude from examinations of the 92nd and 93rd-95th 
Congresses, respectively, that Democrats are indeed more 
favorably disposed toward environmental legislation. 
Given these findings, a brief explanation of why such 
differences exist is in order. Clausen (1973: 143) sum-
marizes the differences in parties by stating: 
partisan differences in behavior reflect the tra-
ditional alignment of the Republican party with 
the business community and the ideology of free 
enterprise, and the Democratic party's support for 
the intervention of the federal government in 
economic affairs. 
Clearly, the business community may be expected to 
oppose costly pollution abatement regulations because such 
controls are expensive and add nothing to the value of the 
product they are producing. Regulatory controls also 
require governmental intervention and this runs contrary to 
the Republican ideology of free enterprise. Therefore, 
partisan differences on environmental legislation are evi-
dent because the parties are committed to different policy 
goals. 
Ideology 
In addition to the effects of partisanship on legis-
later's voting decisions, the literature suggests that 
ideology also provides explanatory power (Clausen, 1973; 
Schneider, 1979; Shaffer, 1980). It is customary to think 
of legislators as either conservative or liberal. Although 
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conventional understanding of these terms may be sufficient, 
a brief definition of their meaning is appropriate. 
Central aspects of conservatism are experience 
(tradition), stability, and the prudent use of 
power. The liberal values imagination, change, 
and broad distribution of power resources while 
not being adverse to centralization of the 
employment of power . . . • The liberal favors 
the use of government to ameliorate the ills of 
society, the conservative looks upon the growth of 
government as an unnatural and even malignant 
phenomenon. To the liberal, government is good; 
to the conservative good government is limited 
(Clausen, 1973: 101-102). 
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Given this delineation, one might conclude that conser-
vatives are more likely to oppose active governmental 
involvement in environmental protection programs while 
liberals may advocate the use of government to deal with the 
problems of environmental quality. Realizing that Repub-
licans are more conservative and Democrats more liberal 
leads one to obvious predictions about their policy pre-
ferences. 
Mitchell (1977) provides an interesting comment on the 
role of ideology in the environmental area. Speaking on 
energy issues and ideology he states: 
When people do not understand an issue they tend 
to moralize, and act on the basis of ideology. By 
ideology I mean that general body of beliefs that 
you consult when you have to make a judgement on 
something you know nothing about . . . the energy 
crisis is a crisis of public policy founded on 
misconceptions of the issue and therefore a slave 
to ideology (21082). 
In his study on the affects of ideology, Mitchell 
(1977) groups Congressmen into 22 classes using the liberal-
conservative ratings of the Americans for Democratic Action. 
He finds a significant correlation between the natural gas 
deregulation vote and these ratings. He concludes that 
ideology is more important than partisanship and constitu-
ency variables in predicting a Congressman's voting decision 
on this bill. 
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Other studies have also found the importance of 
ideology in influencing legislator's voting decisions on 
environmental issues. In the area of government management 
(which includes environmental programs and regulations), 
Clausen (1973) finds that liberals are more supportive of 
these types of policies than conservatives. Ritt and 
Ostheimer (1974), Dunlap and Allen (1976), and Kenski and 
Kenski (1980) also discover that liberals vote more pro-
environmentally than conservatives. Given these findings, 
an examination of legislative voting in the area of environ-
mental policy should include ideology as an explanatory 
variable. 
Constituency Characteristics 
In addition to partisanship and ideology, congressional 
voting behavior may be influenced by constituency charac-
teristics. This influence may arise out of a legislator's 
desire to accurately vote in accordance with constituency 
desires. In return for this type of "actual" representation 
(see Pitkin, 1967), a legislator expects electoral support. 
Miller and Stokes (1963) discuss the control a constituency 
can have on legislative voting behavior. They state: 
Broadly speaking, the constituency can control the 
policy actions of the representative in two alter-
native ways. The first of these is for the 
district to choose a representative who so shares 
its views that in following his own convictions he 
does his constituents' will . . . . The second 
means of constituency control is for the congress-
man to follow his (at least tolerably accurate) 
perceptions of district attitude in order to win 
re-election. In this case constituency opinion 
and the congressman's actions are connected 
through his perception of what the district wants 
(50). 
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Miller and Stokes (1963) found for certain issue areas, that 
if one knows a representative's policy view and his percep-
tion of his constituent's views, then prediction on roll 
call votes is quite successful. 
Given these constituency influences, it is reasonable 
to assume that areas composed of environmentally concerned 
citizens will be represented by legislators which share 
their concern. Evidence indicates that environmental 
concern is positively associated with socioeconomic status 
and education, and negatively associated with age (Tognacci 
et al., 1972). Trop and Roos (1971: 53) state that "the 
poor, the black, and those with only a grade-school educa-
tion have been least likely to care about improving environ-
mental quality." 
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to obtain 
direct and accurate measures of constituency's environmental 
concern. Constituent's policy preferences, however, may be 
inferred from demographic characteristics. Early roll call 
studies have used this method to explain voting behavior of 
legislators (MacRae, 1958; Shannon, 1968; Turner and 
Schneider, 1970; Clausen, 1973). Similarily, in the 
environmental area, Ritt and Ostheimer (1974: 462) found 
that "Ecology minded congressmen tend to come from rela-
tively well-to-do metropolitan districts in the East with 
higher proportions of white collar workers." Dunlap and 
Allen (1976: 392) report that urban and socioeconomic 
variables are "significantly correlated with representa-
tives' pro-environmental voting scores." Kenski and Kenski 
(1980) also found that support for pro-environmental voting 
is strongest in the east and urban and suburban districts 
and is weakest in the south and rural and mixed districts. 
Constituency characteristics, then, may also affect legis-
lative roll call behavior. 
Summary and Hypotheses 
17 
Previous studies support the assertion that partisan-
ship, ideology, and constituency characteristics affect a 
legislator's support for, or opposition to, environmental 
legislation. To further test this conclusion, the following 
hypotheses are tested for the 97th Congress. 
H1 Democratic members of Congress (representatives and 
senators) are more supportive of environmental legislation 
than Republican members. 
H2 Liberal members are more supportive of environmental 
legislation than conservative members. 
H3 Members from the east are more supportive of 
environmental legislation than members from the midwest, 
south, or west. 
H4 The more urban a district or state is, the more 
supportive the members will be of environmental legislation. 
H5 The more affluent a district or state is, the more 
supportive the members will be of environmental legislation. 
H6 The more industrialized a district or state is, the 
more supportive the members will be of environmental legis-
lation. 
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The following chapter is an examination of the research 
design employed in this study to test these hypotheses. 
CijAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The analytic goal of this study is to examine the 
impact of partisanship, ideology, and constituency charac-
teristics on legislators' support for, or opposition to, 
environmental legislation in the 97th Congress. This chap-
ter outlines the research design employed in the study and 
includes a discussion of the dependent and independent 
variables and the statistical methods utilized. 
Dependent Variable 
A member's support for environmental legislation serves 
as the dependent variable. This support is determined by 
ratings of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV).1 These 
ratings are based on the percentage of time each legislator 
voted with the League's position on selected votes. These 
votes involved such issues as water projects, synthetic 
fuels, and energy conservation (see Appendix B). Lobbyists 
for many leading national environmental groups select LCV's 
key votes; thus, the votes should represent a consensus of 
opinion on what constitutes pro-environmental voting (LCV, 
1981). 
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Although the use of interest group ratings has its 
limitations (see Keller, 1981; Fowler, 1982; Anderson et 
al., 1966), scholars continue to employ these ratings in 
their analyses of Congress (Kingdon, 1973; Deckard and 
Stanley, 1974; Parker and Parker, 1979; Schneider,. 1979; 
Abramowitz, 1980). Ritt and Ostheimer (1974: 460) justify 
the use of LCV ratings by stating: 
(1) .they are "hard data'' subject to empirical 
analysis; (2) they allow the researcher to view 
each legislator's behavior over a wide variety of 
issues; and (3) they are considered to be impor-
tant by the various groups which rate congressmen, 
regardless of any warnings that they may give. 
In their analysis of pro-environmental voting, Kenski and 
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Kenski (1980) also claim that the LCV scores are representa-
tive and valid. 
Independent Variables 
In general, the independent variables--partisanship, 
ideology, and constituency characteristics--are used to 
explain variation in members' LCV scores. The indicators 
used for each independent variable follows and are sum-
marized in Table III. 
Partisanship 
Partisanship, of course, is determined by party 
affiliation. In the 97th Congress there are 193 Republicans 
and 242 Democrats in the House. The Senate is composed of 
55 Republicans and 45 Democrats. 
TABLE III 
























Median Family Income 






aLcV scores, party identification, and ADA/ACA ratings are from Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (July 3, 1982): 1612-1619. 
bRegional designations are based on The Alamanac of American Politics 1984. District data on median family income, percent blue-collar, and-residential patterns are found in 
CQ's Congressional Districts in the 1970s, 2nd ed. (1974). State data on affluence and 
industrialization are from Hofferbert (1968) and Morgan and Lyons (1975). Data on the 




Ideology is determined by two interest group ratings--
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the Americans 
for Constitutional Action (ACA). ADA ratings are a measure 
of a legislator's liberalism. For example, the group 
opposes cuts in social programs and supports a limitation of 
U.S. military aid to El Salvador. ACA is a conservative 
group which, among other things, stands for limited govern-
ment, free enterprise, and anti-communist foreign policy. 
Both ADA and ACA ratings are determined by the percentage of 
time a member voted in accordance with the group's position 
on their selected votes (Keller, 1982). Poole (1981: 58) 
confirms the validity of these scores by stating: 
Many insvestigators over the years have used the 
ADA and ACA ratings as measures of liberalism/ 
conservatism in empirical studies of Congress . . 
. the confidence investigators have had in these 
ratings as measures of liberalism/conservatism was 
not misplaced. The mean r-squares for the ACA and 
ADA over the ten years were .937 and .913, 
respectively, indicating that as measures of 
liberalism/conservatism the ACA and ADA ratings 
are good bets. 
Constituency Characteristics 
The impact of constituency on member's pro-
environmental voting records is examined at the district 
level for the House and the state level for the Senate. In 
general, region, residential patterns, affluence, and indus-
trialization are considered for both houses. With the 
exception of region, different measures are employed for 
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each level due to the unique characteristics of district and 
state constituencies and the availability of more sophis-
ticated measures at the state level for affluence and 
industrialization. 
A member's district or state is classified into one of 
four regions--east, south, midwest, or west (Barone, 
Ujifusa, 1984). There are 12 states in the east and midwest 
and 13 in the south and west. 
A district's residential pattern is designated as 
either urban, suburban, non-metropolitan, or mixed according 
to Congressional Quarterly data which is based on Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CQ, 1974). If a district is 
50 percent or more urban, suburban, or non-metropolitan then 
it is classified as such a district. The remaining dis-
tricts which are composed of less than 50 percent of a given 
residential pattern are designated as mixed (Kenski and 
Kenski, 1980). States are classified with U.S. Census data 
by the percent to which they are urban (Statistical 
Abstract, 1981). 
For congressional districts, affluence is measured by 
the median family income of the district and industrializa-
tion is a reflection of the percent of blue collar workers 
in the district. For states, more sophisticated indicators 
of affluence and industrialization are available and there-
fore employed. Hofferbert (1968), through a process of 
factor analysis of 21 socioeconmic variables and indicators, 
developed scores for each state which measure the degree to 
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which the state is industrial and affluent. Morgan and 
Lyons (1975) updated these scores and confirm their validity 
for determining socioeconomic distinctions among the states. 
These·updated scores are utilized in this analysis. 
Statistical Methods 
To determine the effects of the three types of indepen-
dent variables on pro-environmental voting, a series of 
crosstabulation analyses are performed. To facilitate this 
analysis, LCV, ACA, ADA, state urbanization, affluence, and 
industrialization measures are each collapsed into three 
categories.2 This division by percentages equally divides 
the scores into high, moderate, and low values (see Appendix 
A). An analysis of mean LCV scores is also performed for 
each category of the independent variables. In addition, 
Somers' d3 (Andrews, et al., 1981) and Cramer's v4 (Nie, et 
al., 1975) are used as measures of association to determine 
the extent to which the va~iables covary.5 The chi-square 
test of statistical significance is also employed.6 
NOTES 
1. LCV scores are computed by dividing the number of 
correct votes--as defined by LCV--by the total number of 
votes actually cast (ignoring absences). Then one point 
is subtracted for each unexcused absence. Excused 
absences are official committee business, family 
business or illness, or district disaster. The 1981 
ratings 9onsidered 16 Senate votes and 14 House votes 
(LCV, 1981). Appendix B contains a list of these votes 
for both houses. 
2. Dunlap and Allen (1976) and Kenski and Kenski (1980) 
also collapse their pro-environmental voting scores into 
three categories. Unfortunately, neither explain the 
basis by which thes~ scores are divided. 
3. Somers' d is a measure of association between two 
ordinal variables when a distinction is made between 
dependent and independent variables (Andrews, et al., 
1981). The statistic ranges from O, for no association, 
to 1, for perfect association. See also Somers, 1962, 
for a discussion of this statistic. 
4. Cramer's V is a measure of association between two 
nominal variables when at least one variable has more 
than two categories. Cramer's V ranges from 0, no 
association, to 1, perfect association (Nie, et al., 
1975). In this analysis, Cramer's Vis used to measure 
association between an ordinal and nominal variable with 
more than two categories. The ordinal variable is 
treated as nominal so that a measure of association may 
be employed. This technique is utilized because a 
consensus does not yet exist on a proper measure of 
association between ordinal and nominal variables with 
more than two categories. 
5. Labeling an association between two variables as weak, 
moderate, or strong is a subjective determination. This 
author realizes the discretionary nature of this task 
yet engages in such labeling given his understanding of 
the variables and data. 
6. Strickly speaking, tests of statistical significance are 
not appropriate except where a sample is being analyzed. 
Nonetheless, it has become common practice to note 
"significance" for population data as a way of 
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indicating those relationships that are especially 
strong or noteworthy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING: 
A CROSSTABULATION ANALYSIS 
The effects of partisanship, ideology, and constituency 
characteristics on pro-environmental voting were analyzed 
using data on the 97th Congress and district and state 
characteristics. The results of this analysis follows. 
Partisanship 
In general, the data support the existence of partisan 
differences on environmental issues (see Table IV). In both 
the House and Senate, Republicans have lower average LCV 
scores than do Democrats. For example, in the House, a 
majority of Republicans (55%) exhibit low support for 
environmental legislation while a majority (55%) of 
Democrats are highly supportive of such legislation. 
Similarily, in the Senate, 49 percent of the Republicans 
have low LCV scores while 65 percent of the Democrats have 
high LCV scores. A comparison of both houses indicates that 
Senate Republicans and Democrats are less favorable of 
environmental legislation than their House colleagues. 
Overall, partisanship and environmental support are strongly 
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associated (d = .56 House, .57 Senate) and the relationship 
is statistically significant (p < .01). 
TABLE IV 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTISANSHIP AND ENVIRONMENTAL 



















aChi-Square = 118.15 
Degrees of Freedom = 2 
Significance, p < .01 
Somers' d = .• 56 
bchi-Square = 30.01 
Degrees of Freedom = 2 
Significance, p < .01 



















Ideological differences also explain variations in 
member's support for environmental legislation. An examina-
tion of ACA scores, which measure a member's level of 
conservatism, indicates that the majority of Representatives 
and Senators with high ACA scores are classified as low on 
the environmental support scale. Also, the lowest LCV 
scores are from members with the highest ACA scores. In 
other words, this negative association (d = -.66 House, -.57 
Senate) implies that the more conservative a member is the 
less supportive he/she will be of environmental legislation 
(see Table V). 
ADA scores, which are a measure of a member's liberal-
ism, exhibit a strong positive association (d = .75 House, 
.77 Senate) with pro-environmental voting. A substantial 
majority of Representatives (89%) and Senators (90%) with 
high ADA scores also have high LCV scores. This association 
indicates that the more liberal a member is the more 
supportive he/she will be of environmental legislation (see 
Table VI). 
Constituency Characteristics 
To analyze the effects of constituency on member's 
environmental voting, with the exception of region, 
different measures are employed for district and state 
constituencies. These measures differ because of the unique 
nature of district and state constituencies and the 
availability of more sophisticated indicators of indus-
trialization and affluence at the state level. Conse-
quently, these separate measures prevent direct comparison 
between the House and Senate. 
TABLE V 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACA SCORES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 
Low Environmental 
Support X (%) % 










aChi-Square = 262.04 
Degrees of Freedom = 4 
Significance; p < .01 
Somers' d = -.66 
bchi-Square = 49.61 
Degrees of Freedom = 4 
Significance, p < .01 






























THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADA SCORES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE AND SENATEa 
Environmental 
Support 
HOUSEb - LCV Score 
Low 
High 




















aTo eliminate the affect of zero cells on the measure 
of association, LCV and ADA scores for the House and Senate 
are collapsed into 2 X 2 tables. 
bchi-Square = 246.21 
Degrees of Freedom = 1 
Significance, p < .01 
Somers' d = .75 
cChi-Square = 57.75 
Degrees of Freedom = 1 
Significance, p < .01 
Somers' d = .77 
Region 
To determine the effect of geographical location on 
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environmental support, both Senators and Representatives are 
classified by the region of the country which they repre-
sent. An analysis of mean LCV scores by region and the 
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degree of association suggests that the use of such a 
classification system does account for variations in 
environmental support. As Table VII reveals, in both the 
House and Senate, eastern members have the highest average 
LCV scores and southern members have the lowest s9ores. The 
variables are moderately associated (V = .26 House; .28 
Senate) and the relationship is statistically significant (p 
< .01). It is interesting to note that ~he differing 
strengths of regional support for environmental legislation 
in the Senate is mirrored in the House--even though 
Representatives must consider much smaller geographical 
constituencies. 
Residential Patterns 
Although residential patterns of districts and states 
are examined with separate measures, both indicate that the 
extent of urbanization affects pro-environmental voting. In 
the House, Representatives from urban and suburban districts 
have the highest average LCV scores while those who repre-
sent districts which are classified as non-metropolitan or 
mixed have the lowest scores. A majority (53%) of Repre-
sentatives from urban districts have high LCV scores while a 
majority (55%) of those from non-metropolitan districts have 
low scores. The variables are also moderately associated 
with a V score of .24 (see Table VIII). Although only the 
extent of urbanization is examined in states, the data 
suggests that Senators from highly urbanized areas are the 
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most supportive of environmental legislation (see Table IX). 
The relationship, however, is somewhat weak (d = .19) and is 
not statistically significant (p < .12). 
TABLE VII 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 
Environmental 
Support 


















aChi-Square = 58.46 
Degrees of Freedom = 6 
Significance, p < .01 
Cramer's V = .26 
bchi-Square = 16.81 
Degrees of Freedom = 6 
Significance, p < .01 
Cramer's V = .28 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISTRICT RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS 





Urban Suburban politan Mixed 
x(%) % x(%) % x(%) % x(%) % 





Chi-Square = 50.91 
Degrees of Freedom = 6 
Significance, p < .01 














THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE URBANIZATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE SENATE 





Support x(%) % 
Urbanization 
Moderate 
x(%) % x(%) % 















Degrees of Freedom = 4 







The extent of affluence in a district or state is 
moderately associated (d = .27 House, .39 Senate) with a 
member's support for environmental legislation. Representa-
tives from districts with the highest median family income 
have the highest average LCV scores (see Table X). An 
examination of state affluence, as determined by Hofferbert 
(1968), also indicates that those states which are classi-
fied as the most affluent have the highest LCV scores (see 
Table XI). In both cases, the relationships are 
statistically significant. 
TABLE X 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME OF A 
DISTRICT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE 
Environmental 
Support 







Chi-Square = 45.01 
Degrees of Freedom = 4 
Significance, p < .01 
Somers' d = .27 
Median Family Income 
Moderate 
















THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AFFLUENCE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE SENATE 
Low High Environmental 
Support x(%) % 
Affluence 
Moderate 
x(%) % X (%) % 






Degrees of Freedom = 4 
Significance, p < .01 













At the district level, industrialization is measured by 
the proportion of blue collar workers in the district (see 
Table XII). The data suggests that a significant relation-
ship between industrialization and environmental support 
does not exist (p < .38). At the state level, although the 
relationship between industrialization and environmental 
support is not strong (d = .24), it is significant (p < 
.05). Senators from the most industrialized states, also 
defined by Hofferbert (1968), have the highest average LCV 
scores. A majority (53%) of Senators from these highly 
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industrialized states also exhibit the highest level of 
environmental support (see Table XIII). The absence of a 
significant relationship between industrialization and 
environmental support at the district level may be 
attributed to either the crudeness of the measure or the 
lack of association between the variables. 
TABLE XII 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROPORTION OF BLUE COLLAR 
WORKERS IN A DISTRICT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT 
IN THE HOUSE 
Percent Blue Collar Workers 
Environmental 
Support 
Low Moderate High 
x(%) % x(%) % x(%) % 






Degrees of Freedom = 4 
Significance, p < .38 














THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE SENATE 
Low 
Industrialization 
Moderate High Environmental 
Support x(%) % x(%) % x(%) % 





Chi-Square = 9.40 
Degrees of Freedom = 4 
Significance, p < .05 












In summary, an analysis of data for the 97th Congress 
indicates that partisanship, ideology, and constituency 
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characteristics aff~ct a legislator's support for, or 
opposition to, environmental legislation. Specific findings 
of this study are: 
Democratic members are more supportive of environ-
mental legislation than Republicans. 
Liberal members are more supportive of environmental 
legislation than conservative members. 
Members from the east are the most supportive of 
environmental legislation, while those from the 
south are the least supportive. 
Representatives from urban and suburban districts 
are more supportive of environmental legislation 
than those from non-metropolitan and mixed dis-
tricts. 
The more urbanized a state is, the more supportive 
the Senator is of environmental legislation. 
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The more affluent a district is, the more supportive 
the Representative is of environmental legislation. 
The more affluent a state is, the more supportive 
the Senator is of environmental legislation. 
The more industrialized a state is, the more suppor-
tive the Senator is of environmental legislation. 
In general, all hypothesized relationships posited in 
Chapter II were supported by the data except for the 
relationship between district industrialization and 
environmental support. As previously mentioned, the 
crudeness of the measure or the lack of association between 
the variables may account for the failure of the data to 
support this hypothesis. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
In general, this study supports the findings of previous 
examinations in this area of inquiry and confirms the 
influence of partisanship, ideology, and constituency 
characteristics on environmental voting behavior. This 
study also indicates that the influence of these factors has 
persisted under an administration which values economic 
growth over the ~reviously strong committment to environ-
mental quality considerations. The persistence of these 
influences may indicate that legislators rely more heavily 
on pressures and cues from their party, ideology, and 
constituency than from presidential priorities. If this is 
indeed true, presidents should expect to find it difficult 
to substantially affect legislators' environmental voting 
decisions. 
This examination extended previous studies by con-
sidering the factors affecting senatorial environmental 
voting. Partisanship, ideology, and constituency charac-
teristics were all found to be important variables affecting 
Senators' environmental voting behavior. Senators were 
found, however, to be less favorable of environmental legis-
lation than Respresentatives. The mean LCV scores for 
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Senators is 42.8 while Representatives have a mean score of 
48.9. This finding is somewhat surprising given the 
influence that liberals have had in the Senate (Foley, 
1980). Perhaps this difference in environmental support is 
attributable to the Republican majority in the Senate and 
the Democratic majority in the House. The variation may 
also be related to the differing constituencies of Represen-
tatives and Senators. 
Average LCV scores in both the House and Senate may be 
considered somewhat low with both scores below 50 percent. 
Environmentalists might claim that, in general, legislators 
are not adequately protecting the environment. It is 
possible, however, that legislators are merely being 
affected by the lack of public consensus on economic and 
environmental issues mentioned in Chapter I. Consequently, 
in the absence of clear citizen preferences, legislators may 
be unsure of how to best represent their constituents. As a 
result, voting decisions may significantly vary as legisla-
tors seek to resolve vacillating constituenci views and 
preferences. 
Overall, this study may provide explanatory and predic-
tive power in the area of economic-environmental policy. At 
the individual level, if one knows a member's party, 
ideology, and constituency characteristics, then he may make 
assumptions about the members' level of support for environ-
mental legislation. For example, given the findings of this 
study, if a member is democratic, liberal, and from the east 
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he is more likely to support environmental legislation than 
a member which is Republican, conservative, and southern. 
Similarily, at the aggregate level of the House or Senate, 
one may assume that if a majority of a house is Democratic 
and liberal then they are more likely to produce pro-
environmental policies. Such generalizations may be used to 
understand individual and collective policy decisions. 
Knowledge and understanding of legislators' dispositions 
toward environmental issues provides citizens and interest 
groups with valuable information. For example, those among 
these groups which are environmentally concerned may choose 
to support Democrats and liberals over Republicans and 
conservatives. This knowledge, then, allows particular 
inputs to be channelled to the most receptive facets of the 
economic-environmental policy process. 
While the legislative branch and voting behavior served 
as the focal point of this analysis, it is necessary to 
again emphasize that the Congress is but one arena among 
many which may be used to examine the economic-environmental 
policy process. In addition, partisanship, ideology, and 
constituency characteristics do not wholly constitute the 
universe of factors which influence congressional voting. 
They are, however, significant factors which are related to 
environmental voting behavior. Further research is needed 
to determine what influence these factors have on environ-
mental voting over time as well as the independent effects 
they have on policy decisions. Measures for these factors 
may also be expanded and improved for future analyses. 
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In conclusion, the resolution of conflicts arising in 
the economic-environmental nexus provides a variety of 
unique problems for both citizens and legislators. To 
resolve these conflicts, the legislative branch will 
continue to debate and vote on policies which may have 
substantial impacts on the quality of life for all citizens. 
An understanding of factors affecting these decisions may be 
important to those interested in influencing the outcome of 
this policy process. Therefore, knowledge of the impact of 
partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on 
legislators' environmental voting behavior may facilitate 
the effective channelization of demands and preferences 
within the economic-environmental policy process. 
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0 - 33 
0 - 29 
0 - 30 
0 - 8,550 
0 - 32 
0 - 25 
0 - 38 
0 - 30 
-2.224 - -.299 
0 - 32 
33.8 - 62.3 
Moderate 
34 - 62 
30 - 70 
8,551 - 103,550 
33 - 39 
26 - 48 
39 - 67 
-.240 - .364 
33 - 39 
62~7 - 73.3 
High 
63 - 100 
71 - 1 00 
31 - 100 
103,551 - 171 '100 
40 - 59 
49 - 100 
76 - 100 
31 - 100 
.369- 1.823 
40 - 59 
73.6- 91.3 
aTo faciltate crosstabulaton analyses, each variable was collapsed into 
three categories. This division by percentages equally divides the scores 
into low, moderate, and high values. Collapsing the variables by equally 
dividing the potential range of scores (e.g. ACA 0-34, 35-67, 68-100) into 
thirds does not significantly change the resulting degree of association. 
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LCV HOUSE VOTES* 
1. Gramm (D-TX)- Latta (R-OH) substitute to the Budget 
Committee's fiscal year 1982 First Budget Target Resolu-
,tion. This was the substitute supported by the Reagan 
Administration, to set its initial budget targets and 
reduce non-military spending by $180 billion over 
several years. About $18 billion of these cuts came out 
of energy, environmental and natural resource programs. 
Environmentalists oppose the substitute. 
2. Bolling (D-MO) motion to allow separate votes on funding 
cuts for individual programs (including energy and the 
environment), in the fiscal year 1982 Budget Reconcilia-
tion bill. Environmentalists believe they would have 
fared much better had the lawmakers been forced to vote 
separately on energy and environmental programs and 
consider them on their merits. Therefore, they favor 
the motion. 
3. Dannemeyer (R-CA) amendment to a fiscal 1982 appropria-
tions bill to forbid the Environmental Protection Agency 
from spending money to enforce Clean Air Act require-
ments for vehicle emissions inspection and maintenance 
programs. Environmentalists oppose the amendment. 
4. Pritchard (R-WA) - Edgar (D-PA) amendment to the fiscal 
year 1982 Energy and Water Development appropriations 
bill to remove $189 million for the Tennessee-Tombigbee 
Waterway. Environmentalists are against the development 
of the Waterway, and therefore favor the amendment. 
54 
5. Conte (R-MA) - Dingell (D-MI) amendment to fiscal year 
1982 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill to 
delete $4 million in planning funds for the Garrison 
Diversion Water Project in North Dakota. Environmen-
talists do not support the development of the Project. 
6. Bevill (D-AL) motion to the fiscal year 1982 Energy and 
Water Appropriations Conference to agree to a Senate 
amendment allowing construction to continue on the 
Garrison Diversion Water Project. Environmentalists 
strongly objected to this attempt to disregard the 
environmental impacts, circumvent the federal courts and 
violate U.S Treaty obligations. 
1. Frank (D-MA) amendment to the Fiscal year 1982 Energy 
and Water Development Appropriations bill to delete 
$17.8 million for the Stonewall Jackson Dam in West 
Virginia and prohibit further federal spe~ding on the 
project. Environmentalists favor this amendment and 
oppose the Dam. 
8. Loeffler (R-TX) motion to recommit for further cuts the 
House-Senate Conference Report on appropriations for the 
Department of Interior, Forest Service, and some Depart-
ment of Energy programs. Environmentalists were against 
the motion and further budget cuts in these programs. 
g. Simon (D-IL) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Defense 
Authorizations bill to require advance approval of both 
houses of Congress before the funds in the bill could be 
spent on a basing mode for the MX missile. 
Environmentalist favored this amendment. 
10. Rousselot (R-CA) amendment to the Labor-Health 
Appropriations bill, to stop enforcement of the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration regulations for sur-
face mining of sand, gravel, and stone. Environmen-
talists oppose the amendment which they feel will 
decrease protection for miners. 
11. Zablocki (D-WI) -Pritchard (R-WA) motion to adopt a 
Joint Resolution expressing dismay at the U.S. vote 
against the World Health Organization's international 
marketing code for infant formula. Environmentalists 
believe that the U.S government has the responsibility 
to restrict the export of dangerous products and thus 
favor the amendment. 
12. Weber (R-MN) - Wolpe (D-MI) amendment to the fiscal 
year 1982 Interior Appropriations bill to remove $135 
million for a solvent refined coal demonstration plant 
in Newman, Kentucky. Environmentalists favor the 
amendment and oppose the solvent refined coal plant. 
13. Coughlin (R-PA) amendment to the Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations bill to delete the $228 
million appropriated for the Clinch River nuclear 
breeder reactor. Environmentalists favor the 
amendment. 
14. Derrick (D-SC) - Corcoran (R-IL) amendment to the 
fiscal year 1982 Energy and Water Development Appro-
priations bill to transfer $10 million in research 
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money away from the privately owned Burnwell Nuclear 
Fuel Reprocessing Facility in South Carolina, and spend 
it on government nuclear waste research instead. 
Environmentalists favor the amendment • 
• 
LCV SENATE VOTES* 
1. Nomination of James Watt to be Secretary of Interior. 
Environmentalists oppose Watt's nomination. 
2. Nomination of John Crowell to be Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment. 
Environmentalists oppose Crowell's nomination. 
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3. Garn (R-UT) motion to table (kill) the Hart (D-CO) 
amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Continuing Appropria-
tions. The Hart amendment would have restored funding 
for the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council 
on Environmental Quality to levels contained in the 
Conference Report. Environmentalists oppose the motion. 
4. Metzenbaum (D-OH) and Heinz (R-PA) amendment to the 
fiscal year 1982 Budget targets to reduce funding for 
water projects by $300 million. Environmentalists favor 
the amendment. 
5. Percy (R-IL) - Moynihan (D-NY) amendment to the fiscal 
year 1982 Energy and Water Development Appropriations to 
remove $189 million for the Tennessee- Tombigbee 
Waterway. Environmentalists favor the amendment. 
6. Mattingly (R-GA) amendment to make a 5% cut of $380 
million in the fiscal year 1982 Appropriations for the 
Department of Interior, Forest Service, and some Depart-
ment of Energy programs. Environmentalists oppose the 
amendment. 
7. Tower (R-TX) motion to table (kill) the Levin (D-MI) -
Kassenbaum )R-KS) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 
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Defense Authorization bill to require advance approval 
of both houses of Congress before the funds in the bill 
could be spent on a basing mode for the MX Missile. 
Environmentalists favor the amendment. 
8. Proxmire (D-WI) - Nickles (R-OK) amendment to the 
fiscal year 1982 Interior Appropriations bill to remove 
$139 million for a solvent refined coal demonstration 
plant in Newman, Kentucky. Environmentalis~s favor the 
amendment. 
g. Johnston (D-LA) motion to kill the Bumpers (D-AR) -
Humphrey (R-NH) amendment to the Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations bill to reduce by half the 
money for the Clinch River nuclear breeder reactor. 
Environmentalists oppose the motion. 
' 
10. Kennedy (D-MA) amendment to the Budget Reconciliation 
Act to reduce the nuclear fission research and develop-
ment budget by $309 million. Environmentalists favor 
the ~endment. 
11. Bumpers (D-AR) -Hart (D-CO) amendments to the Budget 
Reconciliation bill to increase the budget for solar 
energy research and development, energy conservation, 
and the Solar Energy and Conservation Bank by $450 
million. Environmentalists favor the amendment. 
12. Mitchell (D-ME) - Cohen (R-ME) amendment to the fiscal 
year 1982 Interior Appropriations bill to add $27.5 
million for energy conservation and weatherization of 
low-income homes. Environmentalists favor the amend-
ment. 
13. Dole (R-KS) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Interior 
Appropriations bill to cut $7 million for the Residen-
tial Conservation Service. Environmentalists oppose 
the amendment. 
14. Chafee (R-RI) amendment to the Budget Reconciliation 
bill to restore $500 million for public transportation 
and $100 million to help poor people insulate their 
homes. Environmentalists favor the amendment. 
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15. Kasten (R-WI) amendment to the Noise Control Authoriza-
tion bill to keep federal authority to preempt state 
noise control standards for new motorcycles. Environ-
mentalists oppose the amendment. 
16. Byrd (D-WV) - Specter (R-PA) amendment to exempt the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration from the 4% 
funding cut in the fiscal year 1982 Continuing 
Appropriations Resolution. Environmentalists favor the 
amendment. 
* This information on votes is taken directly from LCV's 
1981 Voting Chart. More specific information on these 
votes may also be found in this publication. 
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